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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1980 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CARL ROSE, 
 
 Appellant 
 
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-09-cr-00084-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 29, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge∗
 
 
(Filed:  July 2, 2012) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________                              
      
RAKOFF, Senior District Judge.  
  
                                                 
∗ The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 
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 Carl Rose (“Rose”) appeals from his conviction for possessing cocaine and for 
carrying a firearm in violation of two federal laws. For the reasons set forth below, we 
affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we set forth only those facts pertinent to our 
analysis. 
 After a trial that began on January 18, 2011, a jury convicted Rose on three 
counts: possession of cocaine base with intent to deliver, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C); carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At trial, the Government offered the results of 
two different tests to show that the substance found when officers arrested Rose was 
cocaine base. First, the Government called Herman Madera, a forensic scientist who 
worked for the Philadelphia Police Department. The Government sought to qualify 
Madera as an expert witness based on the fact that he had conducted narcotics tests for 
the Philadelphia Police Department for more than twenty years. Defense counsel stated 
on the record that he was “very satisfied with [Madera’s] credentials.” After qualification 
as an expert, Madera testified that he had analyzed the substances that the Government 
had recovered when it arrested Rose and that those substances “contained the presence of 
cocaine base.” 
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 The Government also sought to admit into evidence the results of a separate field 
test that the Philadelphia Police Department had conducted. While the Government was 
examining Anthony Ricci, one of the arresting officers, the following colloquy occurred: 
Q: And do you know whether the drugs were tested before they were 
submitted into evidence? 
A: Yes. That’s -- They always have to be tested. 
Q: Okay. And do you know the results of that test? 
 [Defense Counsel]: Objection. 
 THE COURT: Did you do the test yourself? 
 THE WITNESS: I did not do the test, no. 
 THE COURT:  Then I’ll sustain the objection. 
 
The results of the field test to which the Government referred in this line of 
questioning were never admitted into evidence. Nonetheless, during the 
Government’s closing argument, the Assistant United States Attorney made the 
following statement:  
 [Madera’s] been working for the Philadelphia Police Chem Lab, I 
think his testimony was 21 years. Analyzing drugs for 21 years. He knows 
crack cocaine when he sees it. He told you the test that he performed. 
 And he told you that the controlled substance in that bag was crack 
cocaine. In fact, he confirmed that it was crack cocaine, because you might 
recall that the crack was actually field tested by the Philadelphia police, and 
it tested positive for crack cocaine.  
 
In a sidebar following the Government’s closing argument, defense counsel reminded the 
district court that the field test to which the Government had referred had not been 
admitted into evidence. The district court remarked that defense counsel was correct, and 
the Assistant United States Attorney apologized for his mistake. Defense counsel did not, 
however, request that the district court issue any curative instruction in response to the 
Government’s statement.  
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 In defense counsel’s closing statement, defense counsel, rather than arguing that 
the substance was not cocaine base, contended that the Government could not attribute 
possession of the substance to Rose. Specifically, defense counsel noted that “there’s [no] 
cocaine on his gun -- his hands that would be consistent with the bagging of that cocaine. 
Where he puts the cocaine in those 72 separate bags.” 
 After closing statements, the district court specifically admonished the jury that 
“[a]ny proposed testimony . . . to which an objection was sustained by the Court . . . must 
be entirely disregarded.” The district court further instructed the jury that “[q]uestions, 
objections, statements and arguments of counsel, are not evidence in the case,” and thus 
could not supply the basis for the jury’s verdict.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
Accordingly, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Rose argues that his 
conviction must be overturned because the Government relied in its closing argument on 
evidence that had not been admitted during trial.1
 The parties agree that, since defense counsel neither objected to the Government’s 
 
                                                 
1 On November 14, 2011, Rose requested leave to file a supplemental brief pro se. On November 17, 
2011, the Clerk of the Court denied that motion under 3d Cir. LAR 31.3, which provides that “parties 
represented by counsel may not file a brief pro se.” The practice embodied in Rule 31.3 “tends to benefit 
the appellant as well as the court” by focusing the court’s attention on those arguments that, in the opinion 
of experienced counsel, have the greatest chance of success. Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 
163 (2000). Defense counsel subsequently included Rose’s pro se brief as an appendix to his own brief 
and, without endorsing any of Rose’s arguments, asked the court to consider Rose’s brief as a supplement 
to his own. On May 17, 2012, we denied defense counsel’s motion to treat Rose’s pro se brief as a 
supplemental brief. Notwithstanding that denial, we permitted Rose’s counsel to seek “leave to file a 
supplemental brief, drafted by counsel, that sets forth only those arguments raised by the client that 
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statement nor requested a curative instruction, we review Rose’s claim only for plain 
error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). When reviewing for plain error, before an appellate 
court may correct an error, “there must be (1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that 
‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). “If all three conditions are 
met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but 
only if (4) the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). “[T]he plain-error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be 
‘used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would 
otherwise result.’” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States 
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)).  
 The parties agree that the Government’s reference to the field test constituted error 
and that the error was plain. However, the parties dispute whether the error affected “the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” In prior cases, we have 
found that prosecutorial misconduct -- including improper statements made during a 
closing argument -- merits reversal under the plain error standard only where the record 
reveals “egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Brennan, 
326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d 
Cir. 2001)).  
                                                                                                                                                             
counsel believes are meritorious.” Defense counsel never sought leave to submit such a brief. 
Accordingly, we consider only the issue presented in defense counsel’s brief.  
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III. 
 The Government’s reference to the field test does not rise to the level of 
“egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of justice.” As noted above, an experienced 
forensic scientist, Herman Madera, testified at trial that the substances officers discovered 
when they arrested Rose “contained the presence of cocaine base.” Defense counsel did 
not challenge Madera’s qualifications, and the parties do not dispute that the district court 
admitted his testimony into evidence. In his closing argument, defense counsel did not 
dispute that the evidence in the record established that the substance was cocaine base, 
arguing instead that the Government had failed to prove that Rose had possessed the 
cocaine. Thus, the evidence in the record on which the Government based its argument 
amply supported the conclusion that the substance was cocaine base, and Rose essentially 
conceded this point.  
 Moreover, the district court clearly admonished the jury that neither “arguments of 
counsel” nor “testimony . . . to which an objection was sustained by the Court” could 
provide a basis for the jury’s verdict. Cf. United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“We do presume that juries follow their instructions.”). While the district court 
did not specifically refer to the field test that the Government had mentioned, the jury, in 
this relatively short and simple case, could easily make that connection based on its own 
recollection that, when the Government sought to introduce testimony about the field test, 
the district court sustained defense counsel’s objection.  
 Thus, although the Government erred in referring in its closing argument to  
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evidence that the district court had not admitted, Rose suffered no prejudice because the 
evidence in the record amply supported the Government’s argument, the Government’s 
error did not affect Rose’s central contention -- i.e., that he had not possessed the relevant 
substance -- and the district court’s instruction admonished the jury not to consider the 
Government’s erroneous reference. Under these circumstances, the Government’s 
reference to the field test was neither “egregious error” nor “a manifest miscarriage of 
justice,” and the Court’s response to that reference did not impair “the fairness, integrity, 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Accordingly, we have no discretion to 
notice the error on review.2
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
                                                 
2 Rose has also moved to dismiss appellate counsel and proceed pro se, arguing that counsel knowingly refused to 
include certain meritorious issues in the appellate briefs. We construe this as a claim for ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. Such a claim is generally inappropriate on direct appeal. See United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 
268, 271–73 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we will deny Rose's claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
without prejudice to his right to raise this claim on collateral attack. 
